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In September 2019 German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas will officially 
launch the Alliance for Multilateralism at the United Nations, which Bra-
zilian President Jair Bolsonaro regards as a “useless institution.” Since the 
right-wing extremist took office in January 2019, Brazil and Germany have 
been positioned in opposing camps on climate change, migration, and hu-
man rights policies. Bolsonaro’s rhetorical fanning of the flames in Amazo-
nia is only the tip of the iceberg. Brazilian–German relations have not been 
more distant since the Brazilian military dictatorship.
 • Similar to President Donald Trump’s populist modus operandi, Bolsonaro’s foreign 
policy aims at pleasing his political base. Domestic interests are more important 
than global responsibilities such as the protection of the Amazon. Climate change 
has been called a “Marxist conspiracy” by Brazilian Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo.
 • Traditional principles of Brazilian diplomacy such as democratic multilateral-
ism have taken a back seat. National development in technology, infrastructure, 
and trade is the priority goal. The highly competitive agribusiness is a key sec-
tor in this approach.
 • Bolsonaro’s election promise to move the Brazilian embassy in Israel to Jerusa-
lem was addressed to his powerful evangelical base. Cabinet members from the 
military warned that Brazil might become a target of Islamist terrorism, while 
the liberal agricultural lobby is afraid of losing its Middle Eastern markets.
 • Brazilian foreign policy will depend on the outcome of the struggle between 
economic liberals, religious ideologists, and the military. However, the Brazil-
ian government has already transformed itself from an advocate for into a vio-
lator of indigenous, LGBT, and other minorities’ rights.
Policy Implications
Shared Brazilian–German goals are limited to the peaceful re-democratisation 
of Venezuela and soft balancing China’s New Silk Road project. Brazil is on the 
edge of becoming an illiberal democracy. Germany and the European Union 
should start using their economic leverage to side with Brazilian minorities and 
human right defenders. With the recent signing of the EU–Mercosur trade agree-
ment, Europeans should seek to enforce social and labour rights standards as 
well as binding and verifiable regulations on agricultural goods linked to defor-
estation and violations of indigenous rights. 
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Sources of Bolsonaro’s Foreign Policy
Bolsonaro’s foreign policy platform draws from three main sources. The first, and 
perhaps most popularly appealing, is the general anti–Workers’ party (pT) senti-
ment that had taken over a significant proportion of the Brazilian middle class. 
According to the far-right candidate’s narrative, as presented in his campaign plat-
form, pT’s South–South strategy was in fact a global alliance between Brazil and 
murderous dictators, to whom the former presidents had handed over the country’s 
wealth. An offshoot of this thinking was the often-repeated threat that Brazil would 
become “a second Venezuela” – in reference to its neighbour’s political, social, and 
economic breakdown – if the pT won re-election.
Brazil is shifting its priorities towards countries that can offer trade or techno-
logical benefits, particularly democracies such as the united States, Italy, and Israel 
(Bolsonaro 2018). For one thing, Israel speaks directly to the theological beliefs of 
the ever-growing evangelical Christian community in Brazil, which can be consid-
ered the second source of Bolsonaro’s foreign policy promises. Brazilian pentecostals 
have progressively adhered to dispensationalist theology, which elevates Israel – and 
also the recognition of Jerusalem, as its “complete and united” capital.
Anti-globalism is the third – and least understood – source of Bolsonaro’s for-
eign policy platform. It is often mistaken for nationalism or conservatism, but it 
is grounded in a broader, nearly conspiratorial, theory that suggests the West has 
been taken over by globalist forces. Globalism, according to this strand of thought, 
is an ideology that seeks the construction of a “global, opaque, and highly central-
ised bureaucratic apparatus” (Martins 2018) to control populations by rooting them 
out of their core values, particularly the ones related to God, nation, and the fam-
ily. This apparatus is usually identified with the united Nations and its subsidiary 
organs, as well as with the European union. The globalist project, so the theory 
goes, is financed by big corporations and investors – also known as “meta capi-
talists” – and advances a “cultural Marxist” agenda, which includes women’s and 
LGBT rights, gun control, the right to abortion, secularism, and environmentalism. 
Fighting globalism, therefore, would be the only path to restoring traditional, con-
servative values, as identified with Judeo-Christian civilisation (De Carvalho 2015).
Having strategist and alt-right heavyweight Steve Bannon as their spokesper-
son, anti-globalists in the uS helped forge Donald Trump’s campaign narrative. 
Bannon’s Brazilian version is the writer olavo de Carvalho, who has denounced the 
perils of globalism and cultural Marxism since the late 1990s and whose influence 
as a philosophy teacher reached Bolsonaro and his sons’ ears a few years before the 
former congressman decided to run for president. Anti-globalist ideology is driven 
by the desire to regenerate the West – spiritually, economically, and politically. To 
this end, it is necessary to provide unconditional support to Trump – “the only man 
who can save Western civilisation,” in the Brazilian foreign minister’s own words 
(Araújo 2017).
Brazil First: Strategic Priorities
As the presidential campaign progressed, the bilateral relationship with Wash-
ington became the linchpin of Bolsonaro’s global strategy. It was not just about 
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policy, but also identity. The Brazilian far-right candidate often promoted himself 
as the “Tropical Trump,” mimicking the US president’s electoral tactics, rhetoric, 
and mannerisms. Many of Bolsonaro’s supporters imagined him as part of a popu-
lar revolution against the political establishment, which had allegedly been taken 
hostage by the forces of globalism. When it comes to foreign policy, specific aspects 
of Bolsonaro’s platform may be understood as a combination of anti-communism, 
anti-globalism, and of mere reproductions of Trump’s own strategies and interests.
Opposing China
Despite being Brazil’s largest trade partner over the last decade, the Brazilian presi-
dent adopted a fierce anti-Chinese rhetoric during his election campaign. As one 
of his slogans went, “China is not buying in Brazil, it is buying Brazil.” In February 
2018, the then congressman made an official trip to Asia whose itinerary included 
Taiwan. This infuriated the Chinese government, who sent a letter to Bolsonaro and 
other members of his delegation declaring its “deep concern and indignation” about 
a visit that violated the “one China” principle and was an affront to its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity (Gazeta do Povo 2018).
Since Bolsonaro’s election, the state-owned newspaper China Daily has pub-
lished a number of editorials painting a bleak picture of the future of Brazil–Chi-
na relations if the new Brazilian president keeps copying from Trump’s playbook. 
“China has never been the source of problems that Brazil faces today, but rather it 
stands ready to help provide solutions to those problems,” wrote the official news-
paper a day after the president’s inauguration (China Daily 2018). Yet, although 
Bolsonaro has ever since adopted a more conciliatory tone towards China some of 
his fellow anti-globalist advisers still bash the “Chinese threat.” Foreign Minister 
Ernesto Araújo said that Brazil would not “sell its soul” to maintain soybean and 
iron ore exports, and suggested that the long stagnation of the Brazilian economy 
was somehow related to the trade partnership with China (Folha de S. Paulo 2019).
Taking Sides in Venezuela
For many years, Bolsonaro’s anti-communist and anti–Nicolás Maduro positions 
had become an integral part of his political identity. Besides claiming that if the pT 
won re-election Brazil would follow Venezuela’s path into crisis and turmoil, his 
supporters oftentimes said that Brazil should consider the military option to topple 
the Bolivarian regime. Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, the president’s son and a 
loyal de Carvalho disciple, declared that Brazil would deploy its next peacekeeping 
mission in Venezuela “to set our Venezuelan brothers free from hunger and social-
ism” (Brasil 247 2018).
As Jair Bolsonaro was sworn in, Brazil took numerous measures to isolate Ma-
duro. Cuba and Venezuela were the only two countries not to be invited to the Bra-
zilian president’s inauguration, on 1 January 2019. Later that month, together with 
Trump and the Latin American members of the Group of Lima, the Brazilian gov-
ernment recognised congressman Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president.
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Guaidó visited Brasília in late February and received Bolsonaro’s wholehearted 
support, which has been reinforced several times since. It included dispatching a 
humanitarian mission to the border and granting asylum to 25 military deserters. 
In the Brazilian president’s meeting with his counterpart Trump in Washington, in 
mid-March, they discussed the possibility of intervention as the uS president an-
nounced that “all options are on the table” regarding Venezuela (EFE 2019).
Abandoning the Two-State Solution
In 2016 Bolsonaro travelled to Israel as part of a congressional delegation to learn 
about irrigation and defence technology, and took the opportunity to be baptised as 
an evangelical in the waters of the Jordan river. With an eye on the 2018 presiden-
tial race, he sought to associate his image with the one of an imagined Israel – a land 
of conservative political and religious values, whose flag he has waved at all his ral-
lies ever since. As soon as Trump announced the embassy move, in December 2017, 
Bolsonaro also began promising that, if elected, he would follow suit and “copy 
and paste” the uS president’s decree. Moreover, seeking to reverse Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva’s foreign policy legacy, Bolsonaro also pledged to break off relations with 
palestine. “Is palestine a country? palestine is not a country, so there should be no 
embassy here. You do not negotiate with terrorists,” he said to journalists (Haubert 
2018).
In an interview with Israel Hayom the day after his victory, the president-elect 
reinforced his commitment to moving the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem. He also 
said that he would shut down the palestinian embassy and change Brazil’s voting 
pattern on Israel at the UN. Thus he abandoned Brazil’s decade-long position of 
seeking a two-state solution to the Israeli–palestinian conflict (Israel Hayom 2018). 
Contempt for Multilateralism
“If I am elected president, I’ll leave the uN, which is a useless institution. It is a 
gathering of communists.” So proclaimed Bolsonaro at a military ceremony some 
months before the elections. He was enraged at a decision issued by the uN Human 
rights Committee requesting Brazil take all necessary measures to ensure that his 
arch-rival Lula could enjoy and exercise his political rights while in prison, as a can-
didate in the 2018 presidential elections (uN office of the High Commissioner on 
Human rights 2018). Bolsonaro later specified that he would not leave the uN, only 
its Human rights Committee, as well as some international treaties like the paris 
Agreement – which supposedly stripped Brazil of its sovereignty over the Ama-
zon river basin region – and the uN Global Compact for Migration. Although the 
president eventually decided not to quit the paris Agreement, in an announcement 
strategically made on the eve of his trip to the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Brazil still gave up the hosting of the 2019 uN Climate Change Conference (which 
included the 25th Conference of the parties to the uN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change) due to “budget constraints.” Bolsonaro also withdrew from the 
Migration pact, signed by the previous administration only a few weeks before.
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Power Struggle: Liberals, Ideologists, and the Military
Within the government, Bolsonaro’s international choices are far from consen sual. 
Many underlined the economic risks of alienating China, confronting Arab and 
Islamic countries over Jerusalem, threatening to go to war against Venezuela, or 
leaving environmental agreements that could hamper Brazil’s exports to European 
countries. Three main groups hold key stakes in foreign policy. Economic lib erals, 
led by banker and university of Chicago graduate paulo Guedes, have taken over 
the Finance and Trade Ministry and sought to advance a liberalising agenda of free 
trade and deregulation. They are allied with Agriculture Minister Tereza Cristina, 
whose goal is to boost commodity exports by opening up foreign markets. The mili-
tary, represented by Hamilton Mourão, vice president and retired general, as well 
as by other high Army officials, form Bolsonaro’s close circle of strategic advisers. 
Anti-globalists, under de Carvalho’s direct influence, have successfully secured 
meanwhile two sensitive areas of the administration: education and foreign policy.
Bolsonaro has set up an anti-globalist foreign policy triangle, formed by Araú-
jo, international affairs adviser Filipe G. Martins, and Eduardo Bolsonaro. In the 
first months of the administration, they have been responsible for putting forth 
an agenda that involves strengthening ties with Trump, recognising Jerusalem as 
Israel’s capital, turning up the heat against the Maduro regime, and reaching out 
to other nationalist-populist leaders – such as Hungarian prime Minister Viktor 
orbán and Italian Deputy prime Minister Matteo Salvini. The bottom line of the 
anti-globalist platform is to “regenerate” Brazil’s faith in God and sense of nation, 
freeing it from the shackles of cultural Marxism, and subsequently working to “res-
cue” Judeo-Christian civilisation in tandem with the South American country’s new 
allies (Araújo 2018).
Two steps were necessary to this end. The first was to destroy Brazil’s long-
standing diplomatic traditions of pragmatic and universal relations, commitment to 
multilateralism, and peaceful settlement of international disputes. There was also 
an unprecedented bureaucratic reshuffling: whoever disagreed with the new direc-
tives would not participate in decision-making, irrespective of rank or previous ex-
perience. The second step was to redefine Brazil’s priorities. During Bolsonaro’s 
first four months in office, he took four international trips. In Davos, he participated 
in the World Economic Forum – a commitment that had been established by the 
economic team and that had little to do with the anti-globalist agenda. Bolsonaro’s 
bilateral itineraries, however, were quite telling. He went to Washington – his first 
bilateral trip – to meet with Trump; to Santiago de Chile, where he took part in a 
meeting of South America’s right-wing presidents that culminated in the launching 
of a new regional network, prosur; and, to Jerusalem, where he announced – to-
gether with Benjamin Netanyahu – the launching of a Brazilian trade office in the 
city, part of an effort to gradually move Brazil’s embassy there.
Bolsonaro’s anti-globalist foreign policy was met with heavy criticism from 
within his own team. Even before being sworn in, Vice president Mourão gave 
inter views brushing off Eduardo Bolsonaro’s positions on providing assistance to 
an eventual uS military operation in Venezuela and on transferring Brazilian dip-
lomatic representation to Jerusalem. The good working relationship between the 
military and Itamaraty’s diplomats also aroused concern among the government’s 
generals that the break with Brazil’s traditional diplomatic positions could put the 
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country’s international credibility at risk. This led Mourão to take up the informal 
role of “parallel foreign minister,” hosting meetings with ambassadors and delega-
tions from China, palestine, and other Arab countries, and paying visits to Wash-
ington, Beirut, and Beijing (Brasil and pase 2019).
The Israeli embassy affair is also revealing of the administration’s comings and 
goings. While anti-globalists and evangelicals kept pressuring Bolsonaro to make 
moving the embassy to Jerusalem a top foreign policy priority, the military and lib-
erals wanted to prevent that indignation – with Brazil’s decision set to harm  halal 
meat and poultry exports, as many Arab and Muslim authorities had suggested 
since Bolsonaro first began topping the polls. Mourão warned that moving the em-
bassy to Jerusalem might transform Brazil into a target of Islamist terror attacks. 
Finally, the president announced the opening of a trade and investment office in 
Jerusalem, rather than the embassy move.
The agribusiness sector, a first-hour supporter of Bolsonaro’s candidacy, was 
particularly dismayed by the government’s confrontational stance towards some of 
Brazil’s largest trade partners. Even before being appointed as agriculture minister, 
former congresswoman and leader of the agribusiness caucus Cristina voiced her 
concern that Arab and Chinese retaliation would be devastating for the Brazilian 
economy. She has ever since embarked on diplomatic efforts that run counter to 
Itamaraty’s own ones, meeting with chamber of commerce representatives and am-
bassadors from around the world – and even touring across China and Asia prior to 
the vice president’s official visit to Beijing.
Surprisingly, it was the agribusiness lobby again that criticised Bolsonaro’s 
cynical reaction to the large-scale fires in the Amazon rainforest – including the 
baseless accusations made that environmental organisations started them. For-
mer agriculture minister and leading beef producer Blairo Maggi pointed out that 
the environmental policies of Bolsonaro might damage Brazil’s image around the 
world, quoting voices from Germany and Scandinavia calling for boycotts of Brazil-
ian beef. only then did Bolsonaro send the military and some fire-fighting planes.
Even though it is too soon to evaluate the concrete results of Bolsonaro’s for-
eign policy strategies, they have been visibly erratic. The presidential trip to the uS, 
which was promoted as an anti-globalist celebration and included a dinner with de 
Carvalho and Bannon, also aimed to court the military and the government’s liber-
als. Trump offered Brazil the status of a major non-North Atlantic Treaty organiza-
tion ally, which gave the Brazilian military preferential access to the purchase of uS 
military equipment and technology. He also promised to support Brazil’s accession 
to the organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oECD), which 
now rests in the hands of the US Congress.
Nevertheless, what some saw as concessions on Trump’s part came with a side 
agenda that clashed with Brazil’s liberal and military interests. It was expressed 
succinctly by National Security Adviser John Bolton: “We look forward to working 
with [Brazil] on Venezuela, Iran, and China” (Bolton 2019). Indeed, placing Brazil 
as a non-NATo ally could force the country into involvement in some form of mili-
tary engagement against Maduro. Likewise, supporting Brazil’s oECD bid came at 
the price of the country giving up on its special and differential treatment in World 
Trade Organization negotiations, which could weaken Brazil’s position in future 
multilateral trade talks (The White House 2019).
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State of Brazilian–German Relations
However the internal debate between the different government factions ultimately 
plays out, Germany has lost an important global coalition partner. Brazil and Ger-
many are now positioned in opposing camps on key global governance issues such 
as climate change, migration, human rights, and conflict in the Middle East. The 
lack of common strategic goals is calling the Brazilian–German strategic partner-
ship since 2008 and the intergovernmental consultations since 2015 into question.
In April 2019 German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas met his Brazilian counter-
part Araújo as well as Bolsonaro in Brasília. He was the first top Eu diplomat to visit 
the new Brazilian government. Notwithstanding the lack of common goals and val-
ues, Maas still offered, in a positive gesture, to continue intergovernmental consul-
tations. These bilateral cabinet meetings are usually restricted to Germany’s most 
important partners, such as France and Israel.
Germany’s chief foreign diplomat also invited Araújo to the Latin America and 
Caribbean conference held in Berlin in May 2019. This high-profile event brought 
together more than 20 foreign ministers from Latin America and the Caribbean. 
It launched the new Latin America Initiative of the German Foreign office, under-
taken in order to build partnerships in global affairs. However, Araújo – repre-
senting the biggest regional actor – decided not to attend the conference, being a 
diplomatic slap in Maas’s face.
The interests shown by the Brazilian administration on the occasion of Maas’s 
visit were mainly economic ones. Germany is Brazil’s fourth-largest trade partner 
and German direct investment amounts to more than Eur 20 billion. Brazilian of-
ficials are keen for Germany to support Brazil’s bid for oECD membership, despite 
its persistent economic crises. In addition, the bilateral relationship was crucial for 
the conclusion of the Eu–Mercosur trade agreement, announced at the G20 osaka 
Summit in late June 2019. Both issues are seen as milestones in driving forward 
Brazilian integration into technological and business networks from the developing 
to the industrialised world. A bilateral key interest lies in energy, machinery, and 
defence technology transfers from Germany. ThyssenKrupp will build four high-
tech frigates for the Brazilian Navy and transfer the respective military technology.
Few international issues meet with shared goals. The crisis in Venezuela is 
evalu ated similarly insofar as both governments have recognised Guaidó as the 
transitional president and support a peaceful path to re-democratisation being 
taken. Brazil and Germany also pursue common interests against unfair Chinese 
business practices. The Alliance for Multilateralism and the Latin America and Car-
ibbean Initiative can be interpreted as soft-balancing tools to counter China’s New 
Silk road project. The Bolsonaro administration so far has tackled Chinese eco-
nomic expansion only by discursive balancing. Even though their diplomatic means 
might be different, pragmatic cooperation in dealing with Caracas and Beijing can 
further common interests.
At the multilateral level, areas of convergence beyond the diplomatic rhetoric 
are hard to find. Within the G4 coalition Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan to-
gether lobby for reform of the uN Security Council. Even though Berlin and Brasília 
continue pushing for greater influence in world affairs, it is questionable whether 
Bolsonaro is a helpful partner in this endeavour.
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Multilateral areas marked by divergent positions are numerous. In multilateral 
trade, finance, and security negotiations, Brazil was a difficult partner for Germany 
already before Bolsonaro took office. At the WTo, opposing positions are further en-
trenched by structural differences. The Brazilian agricultural business is one of the 
most competitive in the world. Therefore, successive Brazilian governments have 
been interested in reducing agricultural subsidies and tariffs. Germany, France, and 
other European actors want to protect their farmers, but are highly interested in lib-
eralising the industrial sector – which Brazil, contrariwise, wants to protect because 
of its vulnerability at the global level. The Eu–Mercosur agreement represents a 
potential breakthrough in overcoming sector-specific interests, and finding a mid-
dle ground for economic growth.
regarding financial governance, Brazil has never been a strong advocate for 
the global taxation of financial transactions (“Tobin Tax”) and will be less willing 
to control financial markets under the aegis of Guedes. Debates on global security 
norms like the “responsibility to protect” were also marked by divergent views dur-
ing previous administrations. Brazilian political elites are staunch guardians of the 
principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, which are often substanti-
ated by the claimed territorial vulnerabilities of the Amazon and theoretical debates 
on its internationalisation. In particular, the Brazilian army – in the ranks of whom 
Bolsonaro was educated and trained – sees the protection of Amazonia as a key mis-
sion. The armed forces still operate their defence strategies on threat hypotheses 
and secret scenarios that anticipate the invasion of the Amazon by extra-regional 
forces in order to control its natural resources.
In addition to these old divergences, the new Brazilian foreign policy has taken 
polemical positions on global migration, human rights, and climate change policies 
too. The Paris Agreement is under pressure since the US withdrew. Should Brazil 
follow suit, the consequences would be dramatic as the South American country is 
home to a significant proportion of global rainforests; other developing and emerg-
ing countries might also emulate this choice. The actual Brazilian government has 
been acting against the spirit of the treaty from the beginning. Bolsonaro and his 
ministers paid lip service to the paris Agreement in bilateral talks with French 
president Emmanuel Macron and Maas. After Bolsonaro reacted with cynicism to a 
burning Amazon, state leaders and the global public know that the Brazilian presi-
dent cannot be trusted.
Domestically, the Bolsonaro administration promotes the expansion of agri-
business into the Amazon – including deforestation and the clearing of protected 
indigenous territories. recent attempts by Brazilian Environment Minister ricardo 
Salles to change the rules of the Amazon Fund, sustained by the German and Nor-
wegian governments since 2008, led both countries to suspend donations worth 
uSD 70 million. The Brazilian president reacted caustically, suggesting that Europe 
was not in a position to lecture his administration: “Isn’t Norway that country that 
kills whales up there in the North pole?”; “Take that money and help Angela Merkel 
reforest Germany” (The Guardian 2019).
The second value-related divide concerns human rights. Bolsonaro’s hateful 
rhetoric against the LGBT community, indigenous people, migrants, labour unions, 
critical academics, and international human rights activists is now being institu-
tionalised through his policies and having concrete effects. police forces have raided 
over 20 universities to confiscate teaching materials on ideological grounds, espe-
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cially in relation to “anti-fascist history and political activism” – suppressing the 
freedom of expression of scholars. Land invasions of indigenous reserves have in-
creased by 150 per cent since Bolsonaro’s election. At least 16 attacks on indigenous 
communities have been documented thus far, including instances of stoning and 
four homicides.
To make matters worse, the Bolsonaro administration apparently encourages 
extrajudicial killings. public Security Minister Sérgio Moro’s anti-crime package 
allows the often-corrupt military police to kill out of “excusable fear, surprise, or 
violent emotion” in essence giving carte blanche to kill suspects instead of arrest-
ing them. only rio de Janeiro’s police forces already killed 1.075 people in the first 
seven months of 2019, the highest number in recorded history (Terra 2019).
Brazil is on the brink of becoming an illiberal democracy. A provisional meas-
ure in the pipeline orders the monitoring and control of international nongovern-
mental organisations. Another decree excluded LGBT rights from being considered 
by a new human rights ministry. Brazil’s only openly gay legislator, Jean Wyllys, 
left the country for exile in Germany under fear of assassination by the same militia 
group that last year killed the gay rio city councilwoman Marielle Franco. The pres-
ident’s son, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro – aside from corruptive practices – is accused 
of having close ties to the militia group that organised the murder. He employed 
the mother and wife of one of the military police captains suspected of executing 
Franco. The arrested suspect lived in the same condominium, and appears, indeed, 
in a photo with President Bolsonaro.
Where, then, is the red line for German foreign policy to start using its eco-
nomic leverage to push for compliance on upholding human rights?
German Leverage: Trade and Development
The Eu is Brazil’s second-largest trading partner (18 per cent of total trade). There-
fore, the recent Eu–Mercosur agreement, which the Bolsonaro administration cele-
brated as a sign of its own foreign policy credentials, provides a great opportunity 
for the Eu to curb Brazil’s recent positions on human rights and climate change. 
The current version of the agreement provides a framework for cooperation on sus-
tainable development policies, as well as on the promotion and protection of human 
rights – including those related to labour and indigenous peoples.
on the one hand, the final agreement will include binding regulations on agri-
cultural goods linked to deforestation and human rights violations. Brazilian ex-
ports such as soybean and beef are produced in ways directly linked to environ-
mental degradation and the violation of indigenous rights. on the other hand, the 
agreed indigenous rights and environmental standards must be verifiable and their 
non-compliance should result in automatic trade sanctions (banning agricultural 
imports). Experience has shown that the current Brazilian administration only ad-
heres to agreements if otherwise drastic consequences – like beef and soybean boy-
cotts by European consumers – can be expected.
With growing tensions between the Brazilian government and president Ma-
cron – who called Bolsonaro “a liar” and threatened to block the Eu–Mercosur 
deal – Merkel attempted to maintain a respectful working relationship by offer-
ing to call Bolsonaro to express Europe’s concerns over raging forest fires in the 
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Amazon. If Merkel and Macron have not conciously agreed on good cop, bad cop 
negotiation strategy towards Bolsonaro, they might consider to do so. However, 
Merkel prefers to keep difficult partners close as the Eu–Mercosur agreement po-
tentially includes many ways to influence Brazil’s Amazon policies. Geopolitically 
and geo-economically speaking, the agreement is a very significant way to create 
and promote networks beyond the growing concentration of new linkages around 
the Chinese power pole.
It is also part of the story that France and Ireland were critical of the free trade 
agreement even before the fires, mainly because their farmers cannot compete with 
Brazilian (and Argentine) agribusiness. Therefore, Berlin will have to engage in Eu-
ropean diplomacy as well. European partners have to be convinced that an agree-
ment with environmental conditions, verification mechanisms, and trade sanctions 
is the best way to keep the rainforest and its inhabitants alive. Finally, the national 
parliaments in Berlin, Dublin, and paris will have to ratify the treaty and show if 
they really are to take responsibility for “our burning house” (Macron) – or whether 
they only want to protect European farmers from legitimate competition from the 
Global South.
However, recent quarrels over the Amazon Fund are a clear sign that German 
foreign policy-makers should not be deceived by Brazilian cordiality. Bolsonaro and 
Araújo are wolves in sheep’s clothing, and individuals who do not share the val-
ues or long-term goals of the Eu. Instead of continuing Maas’s charm offensive, 
German diplomacy should learn from Trump’s deal-making approach as the uS 
received trade concessions in exchange for supporting the Brazilian oECD bid. A 
tit-for-tat strategy would be a promising way to achieve tangible results on human 
rights and rainforest protection.
The development budget might be better spent if channelled directly to the so-
cial actors under pressure: environmental and human rights activists, favela as-
sociations, indigenous organisations, and the LGBT community. German political 
foundations can play a key role in this regard. Critical academics can be supported 
by strengthening cooperation in education and science. Bilateral research projects 
that focus on climate change, democracy, human rights, and civil liberties would 
encourage Brazilian scholars demoralised and undermined by budget cuts and po-
lice raids.
The German Federal Security Council should examine armament (technology) 
exports to Brazil very closely – in particular, when it comes to the equipment of 
the country’s military police. Further, communication channels with the Brazilian 
armed forces and the generals in the cabinet should be upgraded. Besides the liberal 
faction of foreign policy chiefs, the military has so far shown most caution about 
avoiding an escalation of conflicts driven by fundamentalists. Bilateral defence co-
operation, including military academies based on the “citizen in uniform” principle, 
might be a functional context for the dialogue desperately called for.
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